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1. Introduction
This essay is an attempt to create some model theory specific for the context of
a type being omitted. Inspiration is sought mainly from three classical model the-
oretic theorems and from the infinitary logic Lω1ω. The classical theorems are the
compactness theorem, the joint consistency theorem and the theorem of interpola-
tion. Each theorem is transformed, mainly through the substitution of consistency
with p↑-consistency (pronounciated p-consistency), into one or several properties
applicable on types. The scope of these properties is then being examined to some
extent. The project is mainly inspired by the work of Fredrik Engstro¨m in [1] and
especially [2].
The theorems 2, 3, 6, 11 and 13 can all be considered classical results, that have
only been more or less redrafted to fit the present setting and notation. Theorems
5, 8, 10 and 12 are, to the authors knowledge, new.
None of the definitions are to be understood in any way as conventional nota-
tion. With the exeption of p↑-consistency (definition 1), which is borrowed from
Engstro¨m, all explicit, enumerated definitions are made up specifically for this essay.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Theories. A theory, here generally denoted T , is a set of sentences, called
axioms. The theory is consistent iff no contradictions can be derived from these
axioms. A theorem of T is a sentences derivable from the axioms of T . The set of
all theorems of T is written Th(T ). A theory T is complete iff for every sentence ϕ
expressible in the language, either ϕ or ¬ϕ is a theorem of T .
2.2. Types. A type is a set of open formulas with a certain arity. In many contexts
only interesting, i.e. infinite, non-contradictory sets of formulas are considered to
be types. Others are only concerned with complete types. We will make no such
inscrimination, even though our theorems will only concern countable types. We
will generally use the letter p to denote types.
A type p is realized in a model if there is a tuple of elements satisfying every
formula of p. If it is not realized it is omitted. We let M |= p↓ mean that p is
realized in M and M |= p↑ that it is omitted.
A set of formulas p is a type over a theory T if T has a model that realizes p.
This is equivalent with T ` ∀x¯¬∆(x¯) for no finite conjunction ∆(x¯) of formulas of
p. A type p over T is isolated in T if there exists a formula ϕ(x¯) such that ∃x¯ϕ(x¯)
is consistent with T and T ` ∀x¯(ϕ(x¯) → δ(x¯)) for every δ(x¯) of p. If ϕ(x¯) isolates
p in T and T ` ∃x¯ϕ(x¯), then p is strongly isolated in T . If p is not isolated in T ,
then it is a limit in T .
Date: June 15, 2010.
1
2 PETER HAGBERG
3. Expressibility
Using types, we can express things that are inexpressible using only finite first
order sentences. Whether or not any element satisfies a certain infinite set of
formulas can make a big difference. For example, in first order arithmetic, PA, the
property that every element is finite is inexpressible. If p(x) = {(x > i) : i ∈ ω},
then for every model M |= PA, M |= p↑ expresses this very property.
Types are however not the only way of doing this. Allowing countably infinite
conjunctions or disjunctions but only finite quantification gives at least the same
expressibility. Such limited infinitary logic is called Lω1ω. If p = {δi : i ∈ ω}, it is
easy to see how p↑ is expressed in Lω1ω, simply by
¬∃x¯( ∧
i∈ω
δi(x¯)
)
Expressing arbitrary Lω1ω-sentences using types is more difficult and generally in-
volves infinitely many types of an expanded language being omitted. We will see
more about how this is done in section 5.
4. Consistency
Definition 1. A theory T is p↑-consistent iff it has a model that omits p.
Theorem 2 (Omitting types theorem, Henkin-Orey). If p is a limit in T then T
is p↑-consistent.
Proof. We will prove this theorem under the condition that everything is countable.
To keep everything simple we will also assume that p is unary, even though this is
not actually nessessary for the proof to go through. Let L be the language of the
type and the theory. We will create an expansion T ′ ⊃ T in L′ = L ∪ {c1, c2, . . .},
where {c1, c2, . . .} is an enumeration of new individual constants. We will then
construct a so called Henkin model M |= T ′ whose L-reduct will be a model of T
that omits p. To do this, we need T ′ to be complete, consistent and such that every
existential sentence is witnessed by an individual constant.
We will let T ′ be the union of an enumeration of theories T0, T1, . . . created in
the following manner. T0 = T . Let {φ1, φ2, . . .} be an enumeration of all sentences
expressible in L′ and suppose we have already defined Tn. As will soon be seen, we
only add a finite number of sentences to every new theory, so Tn will be the union
of T and a finite set of sentences {γ1, . . . , γk}. We can assume that no xis occur in
the axioms of T0. If they do occur, we start by replacing them with yis. We now
let γ′1(x1, . . . , xm), . . . , γ
′
k(x1, . . . , xm) be formulas identical with the sentences that
have been added to Tn, but with all new constants replaced by individual variables
x with the same index, so that c1 is replaced with x1, c2 with x2 and so forth.
Let γ(xn) = ∃x1, . . . , xn−1, xn+1, . . . , xm(γ′1(x1, . . . , xm) ∧ . . . ∧ γ′k(x1, . . . , xm)).
∃xnγ(xn) is consistent with T and since p is a limit in T , there will be some
δ(x) ∈ p such that ∃x(γ(x) ∧ ¬δ(x)) is consistent with T . Create Tn+1 by adding
to Tn
i) ¬δ(cn)
ii) φn, if Tn + ¬δ(cn) + φn is consistent, ¬φn otherwise.
iii) ψ(ci), if φn = ∃xψ(x) and φn was added to Tn+1, where ci is the individual
constant with the least index not ocurring in the sentences of Tn or in φn.
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T ′ is complete, consistent and every existential sentence is witnessed by some c.
We can therefore create a model M |= T ′ = ∪n∈ωTn by letting equivalence classes
under identity of the individual constants themselves form a domain. No constant
a of L can realize p, since the formula (x = a) would then isolate p in T . No new
constant c can realize p, because of the way T ′ was constructed, so M, as well as
its L-reduct, will omit p. 
4.1. Compactness.
Theorem 3 (Compactness theorem). A theory is consistent iff every finite subset
of the theory is consistent.
We will not prove this theorem here, but it is actually rather intuitive. If a
theory is contradictory, then the contradiction is derivable from a finite number of
theorems.
Definition 4. We say that a type p is compact if it is true for every theory T that
T is p↑-consistent iff every finite subset of T is p↑-consistent.
Clearly not all types are compact. Let the formulas δi(x) say that there are at
least i different elements non-identical with x. Consider the type pinf(x) = {δi(x) :
i ∈ ω} and the theory T = {∃xδi(x) : i ∈ ω}. Every finite subset of T is consistent
with omitting pinf , but T is not.
Theorem 5. A type p is compact iff there is a finite formula ϕ(x¯) such that for
every model M, p is realized in M iff M |= ∃x¯ϕ(x¯)
Proof. If p is realized in M iff M |= ∃x¯ϕ(x¯), then any theory T is p↑-consistent iff
∃x¯ϕ(x¯) is not a theorem of T . It is a theorem of T iff it is a theorem of a finite
subset of T , so p is compact.
For the converse we suppose there is no finite formula ϕ(x¯) such thatM |= p↓ iff
M |= ∃x¯ϕ(x¯) and show that p is not compact by presenting a theory T such that
T is not p↑-consistent even though every finite subset of T is.
Suppose p = {δi : i ∈ ω} is an L-type. We then consider the L ∪ {a¯}-theory
T = {δi(a¯) : i ∈ ω}. T is clearly not p↑-consistent. We now suppose that T has a
finite subtheory Γ that is not p↑-consistent and derive a contradiction.
As every axiom of T is a formula δi(a¯) with δi ∈ p, so is every axiom of Γ. We
let ϕ(x¯) be the conjunction of the δis from p that occur in Γ. Since a does not
occur in p and Γ is finite, ∃x¯ϕ(x¯) is logically equivalent with Γ. If Γ |= p↓, then
∃x¯ϕ(x¯) |= p↓ and since ϕ is a conjunction of formulas from p, p↓ |= ∃x¯ϕ(x¯). This
contradicts our initial supposition. 
This theorem effectively makes compact types uninteresting. If a property is
expressible with a single formula, then there is really no reason to involve the
unneccessarily complex notion of a type.
4.2. Joint Consistency.
Theorem 6 (Joint Consistency Theorem, Robinson). Let T be a complete theory in
the language L. Suppose T1 and T2 are consistent extensions of T , in the languages
L1 and L2 respectively, such that L1 ∩ L2 = L. Then T1 ∪ T2 is consistent.
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This theorem can be used to prove consistency for complex theories by proving
consistency for their subtheories in the obvious way. Also Lω1ω has a joint con-
sistency theorem, but with the premiss that the joint theory (T ) is complete for
Lω1ω[3, p.281s].
A similair theorem for p↑-consistency could be useful. We shall therefore define
an analogue property for types and see if we can find some criteria determining
whether a certain type has it or not. The property would be most useful if it would
prove to be universal, that is if every type would have it.
Definition 7. We say that an L-type p has the Joint Consistency Property (JCP),
if the following is fulfilled. If T is a complete p↑-consistent L-theory and T1 and T2
are p↑-consistent extensions of T , in the languages L1 and L2, such that L1∩L2 = L,
then T1 ∪ T2 is p↑-consistent.
The type pinf from above has the JCP, simply because it can never fulfill the
premisses. pinf is not a type over any complete pinf↑-consistent theories. For any
complete theory T , either
T ` ∃xδi(x)
for all δi ∈ pinf , in which case every element of every model of T realises pinf , or
T ` ¬∃xδi(x)
for some i ∈ ω, in which case pinf is not a type over T , according to our definition.
This is of course not the way we intend for types to have the JCP. We would
want them to have the property in a non-trivial way, the way that is described in
the definition. It remains an open question throughout this essay, whether or not
any type actually has the JCP in the intended way. What is certain, however, is
that the JCP is not a universal property.
Theorem 8. Not every type has the JCP.
Proof. We first define a set of formulas δi and γi in the language L = {D,G}, where
D and G are binary predicate symbols, such that
δi(x) = ∃y0 . . . yi
( ∧
j 6=k
yj 6= yk
∧
k≤i
D(x, yk)
)
and
γi(x) = ∃y0 . . . yi
( ∧
j 6=k
yj 6= yk
∧
k≤i
G(x, yk)
)
We then let
T0 = {∃x∃y(δi(x) ∧ γi(y)) : i ∈ ω}
and
p(x, y) = {δi(x) ∧ γi(y) : i ∈ ω}
The axioms of T0 say that every δi and γi is satisfied by some object, whereas p
states that there are two specific objects satisfying every δi and γi, thereby being
D– and G–related to infinitely many objects.
None of the axioms of T0 contradict the formulas of p, so p is a type over T0. To
see that T0 is p↑-consistent, just consider the model M0 with dom(M0) = ω and
let M0 |= D(c, d) iff d < c and M0 |= G(c, d) iff d < c.
We do however need a complete theory and will therefore create M |= T0 + p↑
in order to let T = Th(M). The modelM0 is not very well suited for this purpose,
because M0 |= D(x, y) ↔ G(x, y) and because it makes D and G discrete orders
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with maximal elements. This means that the place an element has in the order D
can be used to determine which place it has in G, making it impossible for us to
reorder one predicate without affecting the other. We will therefore separate the
domains of the predicates, expanding T0 to
T ′0 = T0 ∪ {∀x
(
(∃y(D(x, y) ∨D(y, x)))↔ ¬(∃y(G(x, y) ∨G(y, x))))}
To ensure preserved p↑-consistency, consider the model M with dom(M) = {ci :
i ∈ ω} ∪ {di : i ∈ ω} such that D(x, y) iff x = di, y = dj and i > j and G(x, y) iff
x = ci, y = cj and i > j.
SinceM |= T ′0∪p↑, it suits our purposes and we let T = Th(M). We then expand
T into two new theories T1 and T2. Let L1 = L ∪ {a}, T1 = T ∪ {δi(a) : i ∈ ω},
L2 = L ∪ {b} and T2 = T ∪ {γi(b) : i ∈ ω}.
We let N |= PA be non standard and construct models of T1 ∪ p↑ and T2 ∪ p↑.
Let dom(A) = {dom(N ) ∪ {ci : i ∈ ω}}, interprete a as any non standard
element of N and let D(x, y) iff N |= x > y and G(x, y) iff x = ci, y = cj and i > j.
A |= T1 ∪ p↑.
We create B in basically the same way, but let the domain of G be non-standard
and let the domain of D be as in M.
In T1 ∪ T2, p is strongly isolated by the formula x = a ∧ y = b, so this theory is
not p↑-consistent. 
If JCP would have been a universal property among types, we could have used it
to build p↑-consistent extensions of theories for all types p. As this was not the case,
we could try to define a weaker property, either by strengthening the premisses in
the definition or by weakening the conclusion.
Demanding that p should be non-isolated in T1 and in T2 is not enough, since
it is non-isolated already in this counterexample. To see this we can regard p as
a composition of two types, q = {δi(x) : i ∈ ω} and r = {γi(x) : i ∈ ω}, so that
(c1, c2) realizes p iff c1 realizes q and c2 realizes r. T1 = T ∪ {δi(a) : i ∈ ω} implies
T1 ` ¬γi(a) for every γi ∈ r. There are no further additions to T1 so r will not be
isolated in T1 unless it is isolated in T. The same is true for q and T2. In a complete
theory, a type is either strongly isolated or a limit. Both q and r can therefore not
be isolated in T , as both types, and thereby p, would be strongly isolated in T .
Another possible addition to the premisses could be that both extensions should
be complete, but we can easily replace T1 with Th(A) and T2 with Th(B) in the
counterexample, making it an exception from such a property as well.
We could weaken the conclusion by stating that T ′ might not be p↑-consistent,
but at least p is not strongly isolated in T ′, but again, the counterexample is already
at hand.
4.3. Joint isolation. There is however a certain dividedness over our counterex-
ample, which we can describe schematically as T1 → A and T2 → (A → p↓). We
shall formally define this phenomenon as joint isolation and prove that, in the set-
ting above, it is equivalent with p being isolated in T1 ∪ T2 by a conjunction, with
one conjunct from T1 and one from T2. There might not be any obvious way of
using the resulting theorem in the construction of p↑-consistent theories, but it still
gives some characterisation within the field.
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Definition 9. Let T1 and T2 be theories in L1 and L2, such that L1 ∩ L2 = L
and let p = {δi(x¯) : i ∈ ω} be an n-ary L-type over both theories. If there are
L-formulas θi(x¯), an L1-formula ϕ(x¯) and an L2-formula ψ(x¯) such that
T1 ` ∀x¯(ϕ(x¯)→ θi(x¯))
and
T2 ` ∀x¯(ψ(x¯)→ (θi(x¯)→ δi(x¯)))
for all i ∈ ω, then we say that p is jointly isolated in T1 and T2 by ϕ(x¯) and
ψ(x¯).
Theorem 10. Let T1 and T2 be consistent theories in L1 and L2 respectively, such
that L1 ∩ L2 = L. Let p be an n-ary L-type over both theories and let ϕ(x¯) and
ψ(x¯) be n-ary formulas in L1 and L2 respectively.
p is isolated in T ′ = T1 ∪ T2 by ϕ(x¯) ∧ ψ(x¯) iff p is jointly isolated in T1 and T2
by ϕ(x¯) and ψ(x¯).
Proof. ⇒
Suppose p is isolated in T ′ by the formula ϕ(x¯) ∧ ψ(x¯). This means that
T ′ ` ∀x¯(ϕ(x¯) ∧ ψ(x¯)→ δi(x¯))
for every δi ∈ p.
Since all proofs have finite sets of premisses and every theorem of T ′ is implied
by a conjunction of T1- and T2-theorems, there must exist sentences µi ∈ T1 and
νi ∈ T2 such that
` µi ∧ νi → ∀x¯(ϕ(x¯) ∧ ψ(x¯)→ δi(x¯))
for every δi ∈ p.
This can be rewritten as
` ∀x¯(µi ∧ ϕ(x¯)→ (νi ∧ ψ(x¯)→ δi(x¯)))
We now add new constants c¯ to get closed formulas
` µi ∧ ϕ(c¯)→ (νi ∧ ψ(c¯)→ δi(c¯))
According to Craigs theorem of interpolation (Theorem 11), this implication will
have an interpolant θi in L ∪ {c¯} such that
` ϕ(c¯) ∧ µi → θi
and
` θi → (ψ(c¯) ∧ νi → δi(c¯)).
The new constants do not occur anywhere else, so we can replace them with
universal quantification and get
` ∀x¯(ϕ(x¯) ∧ µi → θi(x¯))
and
` ∀x¯(θi(x¯)→ (ψ(x¯) ∧ νi → δi(x¯))).
Every µi is a theorem of T1 and every νi is a theorem of T2, so for every i ∈ ω
T1 ` ∀x¯(ϕ(x¯)→ θi(x¯))
and
T2 ` ∀x¯(θi(x¯) ∧ ψ(x¯)→ δi(x¯))
⇐ Very straightforward from the definition of joint isolation
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T1 ` ∀x¯(ϕ(x¯) → θi(x¯)) and T2 ` ∀x¯(θi(x¯) ∧ ψ(x¯) → δi(x¯)) imply T1 ∪ T2 `
∀x¯(ϕ(x¯) ∧ ψ(x¯)→ δi(x¯)) 
5. Interpolation
Theorem 11 (Theorem of interpolation, Craig). This theorem states for formulas
ϕ and ψ of the languages L1 and L2 respectively, that if ` ϕ → ψ then there is a
formula θ in L1 ∩ L2 such that ` ϕ→ θ and ` θ → ψ
We have already seen the use one can have of this theorem.
Several analogues can be formulated within the realm of omitting types. We will
prove some rather trivial theorems and discuss the difficulties involved in strength-
ening them.
Theorem 10 can actually be regarded as an interpolation theorem for isolation.
The likeness with Craigs theorem becomes even bigger if we let both theories be
empty but let ϕ and ψ be from different languages and p from the intersecting
language. If
` ∀x¯(ϕ(x¯) ∧ ψ(x¯)→ δi(x¯)) for every δi ∈ p
then for every δi ∈ p there is a θi from the intersecting language such that
` ∀x¯(ϕ(x¯)→ θi(x¯)
and
` ∀x¯(θi(x¯)→ ψ(x¯)→ δi(x¯)
q = {θi : i ∈ ω} is thereby an interpolating type.
We could also investigate interpolation between finite sentences of different lan-
guages under the premiss that a certain type is omitted, the case when
Th(p↑) ` ϕ→ ψ.
If ϕ is an L1-sentence and ψ an L2-sentence, then Th(p↑) will be a L1 ∪ L2-theory
and there is no obvious reason why an interpolant should exist. If however the L1-
or L2-reduct of Th(p↑) is enough to derive the implication from, then there will be
an interpolating L1 ∩ L2 sentence.
If Th(p↑)|L1 ` ϕ→ ψ then an L1-sentence Γ ∈ Th(p↑) exists such that
` Γ ∧ ϕ→ ψ.
According to Craigs theorem of interpolation there is an L1 ∩ L2-formula θ such
that ` ϕ ∧ Γ→ θ and ` θ → ψ.
If Th(p↑)|L2 ` ϕ→ ψ then an L2-sentence Γ ∈ Th(p↑) exists such that
` ϕ→ (Γ→ ψ).
There is then an L1 ∩ L2-formula θ such that ` ϕ→ θ and ` θ → (Γ→ ψ).
Either way, a θ exists in L1∩L2, such that Th(p↑) ` ϕ→ θ and Th(p↑) ` θ → ψ.
Finally, we could try to investigate interpolation between types of different lan-
guages. There is an interpolation theorem for Lω1ω, where the interpolant may
be an infinite sentence (Lopez-Escobar). An analogue might be defined for types
of different languages. If the types imply one another formula by formula, then
defining the interpoling type is trivial using the same method that we used in the
proof of theorem 10.
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Theorem 12. If p = {δi(x¯) : i ∈ ω} is a type in L1, q = {γi(x¯) : i ∈ ω}
is a type in L2 and for every γi ∈ q there is a finite subset ∆i of p such that
` ∀x¯(∆i(x¯)→ γi(x¯)), then there is a type r = {θi(x¯) : i ∈ ω} in L1 ∩ L2 such that
` ∀x¯(∆i(x¯)→ θi(x¯)) and ` ∀x¯(θi(x¯)→ γi(x¯)) for every i ∈ ω.
Note that the premiss here is that if a tuple realizes p, then it also realizes q.
This implies |= p↓ → q↓, but the two are not equivalent.
Proof. We simply add new individual constants c¯ to relize the types q and p′ = {∆i :
i ∈ ω}. We then apply the ordinary interpolation theorem for every i ∈ ω. This
gives us a set of interpolants in L1 ∩ L2 ∪ {c¯}. We then replace the new constants
c¯ with x¯ in the formulas to get the desired interpoling type r in L1 ∩ L2. 
If omitting a type of one language merely implies omitting one of another lan-
guage, then the task is more interesting. This is the case when, if p = {δi(x¯) : i ∈ ω}
is a type in L1 and q = {γi(x¯) : i ∈ ω} is a type in L2, p is omitted in every model
that omits q. This is easily translated to Lω1ω, the resulting formula will be
` ¬∃x¯
∧
i∈ω
γi(x¯)→ ¬∃x¯
∧
i∈ω
δi(x¯).
As mentioned above, there will be an Lω1ω-interpolant θ in L1 ∩ L2. The problem
occurs when translating θ back to first order types. New symbols as well as an
infinite amount of types might be neccessary to do this.
Theorem 13 (Chang). Given a sentence ϕ of Lω1ω in the countable language L,
there is a countable L′ ⊇ L and a set S of first order types such that for every model
M,
M |= ϕ iff there is an expansion M′ of M such that M′ omits S
Proof. This theorem is proven through the very construction of L′ and S. L′ will
entail a new n-ary predicate symbol Rσ for every subformula σ of ϕ with n free
variables. An L′-formula ϕ′ is then defined as the conjunction of the following
axioms.
(i) ∀x¯(Rσ(x¯)↔ σ(x¯)), if σ is atomic;
(ii) ∀x¯(Rσ(x¯)↔ ¬Rψ(x¯)), if σ is ¬ψ;
(iii) ∀x¯(Rσ(x¯)↔
∧
ξ<κRψκ(x¯)), if σ is
∧
ξ<κ ψξ;
(iv) ∀x¯(Rσ(x¯)↔ ∃yRψ(x¯, y)), if σ is ∃yψ;
These axioms presuppose that σ has free variables. If this is not the case, we
still don’t want the new predicates to be nullary, as we are going to use them to
define a set of types. For closed formulas σ we therefore add to ϕ′ the axiom
∀xRσ(x)↔ ∃xR(x) and
(i’) ∀x(Rσ(x)↔ σ), if σ is atomic;
(iv’) ∀x(Rσ(x)↔ ∃yRψ(y)), if σ is ∃yψ.
We finally add to ϕ′
(v) ∀xRψ(x).
This means that M |= ϕ iff there is an expansion M′ of M to L′ such that
M′ |= ϕ′. We let ϕ′ serve as a pedagogical bridge between ϕ and S. We shall
construct S so that N |= ϕ′ iff N |= S↑ for every model N of L′. We do this by
transforming the axioms of ϕ′ into types that will together compose S. For axioms
of the form (i),(ii),(iv) and (v), the following one-formula types are added to S:
(i) {¬(Rσ(x¯)↔ σ(x¯))};
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(ii) {¬(Rσ(x¯)↔ ¬Rψ(x¯))};
(iv) {¬(Rσ(x¯)↔ ∃yRψ(x¯, y))};
(v) {¬Rψ(x)}.
For every axiom of the form (iii) we add the one-formula types
{¬(Rσ(x¯)→ Rψκ(x¯))} for every ξ < κ and the proper type
{Rψξ(x¯) ∧ ¬Rσ(x¯)|ξ < κ}.
Thereby S is omitted whenever ϕ′ is true. 
This means that if we apply the theorem on the Lω1ω-interpolant θ, it does not
give us an interpolating type in L1 ∩ L2, but a countable set of types that entails
many new predicates but only the symbols of L1 ∪ L2 that are also in L1 ∩ L2.
This raises the question if such a countable set of types can be comprised into a
single type. The method of simply conjoining S to a single type will not work. If
S = {pi : i ∈ ω} and pi = {δij : j ∈ ω}, then p′ = {δij : i, j ∈ ω} is also a type, but
as different tupels of elements may satisfy the formulas of different types, every pi
can be realized in a model that omits p′. In the special case where all but a finite
amount of the pis are nullary, we can construct p′ so that it gets the same arity as
the sum of the arities of the pis.
6. discussion and conclusion
The compact types have successfully been categorized. They do however not
include any interesting types.
At least one type has been found that had the JCP, but only by not fulfilling
the premisses. No type has been found that had the JCP in the way intended.
In theorem 10, a connection has been established between how a type is isolated
in a compositional theory and its subtheories. The very interesting question of
whether a type can be isolated in the compositional theory without being jointly
isolated is left unanswered. A natural next step, if this project were to continue,
would be to define a weaker JCP, where the type is demanded to be non jointly
isolated in the extensions and to examine the scope of that property.
Several specific interpolation results have been derived from Craigs theorem of
interpolation, but no new general theorem. Also the Lω1ω-theorem of interpolation
has been examined, but it turned out not to be easily manipulated into a general
interpolation theorem for types. Still nothing contradicts that such a theorem may
eventually be proven.
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